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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----0000000----

HENRY MAAS,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.
KENNETH J . ALLRED
ARVEL ALLRED ,

Case No. 14808

and

Defendants,
and
UTAH

BANK

&

TRUST COMPANY,

Defendant and
Appellant.
----0000000----

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
----0000000----

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff-Respondent against
Defendant-Appellant, Utah Bank & Trust Company and others
seeking a money judgment for the wrongful repossession and
commercially unreasonable sale of a 1972 Mack tractor.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories.

Based on the jury's answers, the court entered

judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against Utah Bank and
Trust in the sum of $14, 839. 31 plus interest.

A Judgment of No

Cause of Action was entered in favor of the individual defendar.ts ·.
Kenneth J. Allred and Arvel Allred.

A Notice of Appeal was file: j
I

by plaintiff against the two individual defendants, but this cas: I
has subsequently been settled as to them and that portion of the ~
appeal has been dismissed.

The plaintiff-respondent has reserve:,

its rights against the defendant-appellant, Utah Bank

&

Trust

Company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Judgment of the
trial court against appellant Utah Bank & Trust.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 11, 19 71, Kenneth Allred signed'
note and entered into an Installment Sale and Security Agreement
11
with appellant Utah Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter "Ban k I ·

[Ex 3-P]

The collateral for that Agreement was a 1972 Mack

Tractor, Serial No. RL765LST9476

(hereinafter "1972 Mack").

[Ex 3-P]
Approximately one year later, Kenneth Allred and
respondent Henry Maas

•
f ter "M aas ") entered into an
,hereina

1
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1

agreement by which Maas was to lease the 1972 Mack for a thirtytwo month period, and then, at the end of that time, the lease
money would be used as payment on the 1972 Mack.

[Ex 1-P, Tr 7]

An additional balance of $6,000.00 was to be paid Kenneth Allred
by Maas.

[Ex 1-P]

Maas was to make the payments directly to the

Bank, which payments were to be in the exact amount of Allred's
monthly payments on the Installment Sale and Security Agreement.
[Tr 6-7, 11]

In August, 1974, and in conjunction with other

arrangements between the parties, the remaining balance to be
paid Kenneth Allred by Maas was reduced from $6,000.00 to
$3,500.00 by mutual agreement.

Kenneth Allred specifically

agreed that when the smaller amount was paid, Maas would receive
full ownership and title to the 1972 Mack.

[Ex 2-P, Tr 21-23]

Kenneth Allred informed the Bank that Maas had possession of the 1972 Mack.

[Tr 87]

In January, 1973, Maas began

making the monthly payments to the Bank

[Tr 87] , and eventually

made a total of twenty-six such payments.

[Tr 10, 90]

Those

payments were always late but always accepted by the Bank.

82, 91-92, 97]

[Tr 73,

At no time did the Bank ever tell Maas that it

would not accept future late payments.

[Tr 93]

of the payments made by Maas was $18,720.00.

The total amount

[Tr 10-11, Ex 6-P]

The account balance on the contract was reduced from $23,072.36
at the time that Maas began making the payments to $4,346.38 by
February 1, 1975.

[Ex 6-P, Tr 89]
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By early February 1975, Maas was behind in making two
monthly payments.

[Ex 6-P, Tr 29]

He contacted a Bank loan

officer, Gary Kotter, and agreed to make up the past due payments on February 21, 1975, and then to make another payment on
March 1, 1975.

Kotter, in those conversations, gave Maas no

indication that the Bank would repossess the 1972 Mack without
notice to him.

[Tr 33]

In conversations during the month of

February, 1975, Kotter only indicated the matter would have to
be resolved before the end of February, 1975.

[Tr 95]

On February 14, 19 7 5, Kenneth Allred took the 1972
Mack while it was parked on the lot of F-B Truck Lines Company
in Salt Lake City [Tr 39, 41, 123] while Maas was inside the F-Bj
'

Terminal.

[Tr 39, 12 3]

Maas did not authorize this taking and

received no prior notice of it.

[Tr 42]

Not knowing what had happened to the 1972 Mack, Maas
called Kotter to see if the Bank had repossessed it.
Kotter replied in the negative.

[Tr 9 3]

[Tr. 93]

On February 18, 1975,

Maas personally came in to see Kotter about the tractor.

[Tr H

Kotter told him that the delinquent payments would have to be
made before the end of February, 1975.

[Tr 95]

Subsequently, Maas discovered that Kenneth Allred haci
the 1972 Mack.

[Tr 41]

Thereupon, Maas and Kenneth Allred

entered into an agreement on February 25 , 1975' which in some
particulars amended the November 21, 1972 agreement.
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[Ex

4-Pl

under the terms of the agreement of February 25, 1975, Kenneth
Allred was to return the 1972 Mack to Maas [Tr 46, 124], and
Maas agreed to give Kenneth Allred the right to repossess if all
future payments were not made by the first day of any succeeding
month.

[Ex 4-P]
On the very day Maas signed that agreement, February

25, 1975, Kenneth Allred informed the Bank of the agreement and

of his obligation to return the truck to Maas at the F-B lot.
[Tr. 95]

Without notice to Maas, Kotter met Kenneth Allred at

the place where Maas was to receive the truck, and Kotter requested Allred to drive away the 1972 Mack before Maas could
resume possession.

[Tr 96]

Kotter accompanied Kenneth Allred

as he drove the truck to Bountiful.

[Tr. 96, 126]

When Maas arrived at the designated exchange point, he
discovered that the tractor had been taken away.

Maas contacted

Kotter who told him that the Bank would keep the 1972 Mack until
the delinquency was cured.

[Tr 46-49, 98]

Maas informed Kotter

that he would return to his home in California and get the money
for the past-due installments.

[Tr 49, 51-52, 98]

Maas returned

to the Bank with the money on February 28, 1975, but Kotter
refused to take the payments, and told him that the vehicle had
been sold.

[Tr 49, 98]
On or about February 28, 1975, the Bank had received a

check from Arvel Allred, the father of Kenneth Allred, for the
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payoff amount owing on the unpaid balance.

[Tr 98-100, 127, 19 ~,

Maas never received notice of any private sale.
public sale was held.
the 1972 Mack.

[Tr 10 0]

[Tr 119]

[Tr 50]

No

The bank re leased its lien on

Subsequently Kenneth Allred transferre:J

his interest in the tractor to Arvel Allred.

[Tr 130]

At the

time of trial the title of the vehicle was still in the name of
Arvel Allred although he had leased the 1972 Mack back to
Kenneth Allred who had possession of it.

[Tr 128]

The case was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories.

The questions pertinent to this appeal were answer::

as follows:

(R.

320)
PROPOSITION NO. 6

The disposition of the 1972 Mack Tractor on February
27th or 28th by the Utah Bank

&

Trust Company was a comrnerciall)

unreasonable disposition of the tractor.
True

x

No preponderance of the
evidence either way

False

PROPOSITION NO. 7
The Utah Bank and Trust Company by its acts and conduc:
through its employees and officers, waived payment of the three
payments due on the promissory note until the end of business
hours of the bank on February 28, 1975.
True

x

No preponderance of the
evidence either way

False
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PROPOSITION NO. 8
The Fair Market Value of the Mack Tractor on the 25th
of February, 1975, was in the sum of $20,500.00.
PROPOSITION NO. 9
The defendant, Utah Bank and Trust Company, wrongfully
converted the 1972 Mack Tractor on February 25, 1975.
False

True

x

No preponderance of the
evidence either way

In effect, the jury found that although the 1972 Mack
had a fair market value of $20,500.00, the Bank disregarded
Maas' interests and disposed of the unit in a commercially
unreasonably manner for the $4,346.38 pay-off sum.

The jury

also found that the Bank waived payment of the past-due payments
until the end of the February 28 business day.

The actions of

the bank caused Maas, who was not in default under the leasepurchase agreement, as amended, to lose his equity in the 1972
Mack and his right to purchase it.
Based upon the jury's answers to the special interrogatories and upon the evidence produced at trial, the trial
judge entered judgment in favor of Maas in the sum of $14,839.31,
plus interest which amount represented his equity in the 1972
Mack.

[R 385-386)

The Bank's Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment

and Motion for New Trial were denied.

[R 397)

This appeal

followed.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
I.

BY HABITUALLY ACCEPTING LATE PAYMENTS; BY LEADING

MAAS TO BELIEVE HE HAD TIME TO CURE THE DEFAULT; AND BY FAILING
TO GIVE HIM A SPECIFIC DEADLINE TO MAKE THE PAYMENTS AND/OR BY
FAILING TO INFORM HIM OF THE BANK'S CHANGED POSITION; THE
APPELLANT BANK CONVERTED THE 1972 MACK:
A.

BY THE REPOSSESSION OF FEBRUARY 25, 1975;
and/or

B.

BY DELIVERING THE TRUCK TO KENNETH ALLRED
AFTER HAVING RECEIVED THE PAYOFF FROM ARVEL
ALLRED.

A.

The Appellant Bank Converted The 1972 Mack When I:

Repossessed That Vehicle On February 25, 1972.
This court has generally described the tort of conver·
sion as follows:
A conversion is an act of willful interference
with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is
deprived of its use and possession. The measure
of damages of conversion is the full value of
the property.
It requires such a serious interference with the owner's right that the pers?n
interfering therewith may reasonably be required
to buy the goods. Although conversion results
only from intentional conduct it does not however require a conscious wrongdoing, but only
an intent to exercise dominion or control over
the goods inconsistent with the owner's right.
. Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 76,
328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958).
A converter is liable to a person

~

possession of the chattel as well as to the person in actual
Restatement of Torts 2d §§ 224A and 225 (196S) ·
possession.
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Respondent contends the evidence compels the conclusion that on February 25, 1975 he was entitled to inunediate
possession of the 1972 Mack as to both Kenneth Allred and the
Bank.

On that date Maas signed the amendment to the lease

purchase agreement between himself and Kenneth Allred.

By

virtue of the express language of the amendment, Kenneth Allred
had a conditional right to repossess only if Maas failed to make
future payments to the Bank after the first day of any future
month.

[Tr 84-85]

Even if Maas failed to make the February

payment, Kenneth Allred could not have legally repossessed until
after March 1, 19 7 5.
Maas also had rights to inunediate possession insofar
as the Bank was concerned.

Although there were unpaid install-

ment payments which Maas needed to make, he was in contact with
the Bank.

On or about February 18 or 19 he talked with Kotter.

The transcript reflects the following.testimony by Mr. Maas:
"Question:

What did you say in this conversation?

Answer: We went in and talked to Mr. Kotter,
asked him if we could get the payments for the truck
and could we get the truck back.
Question:
Answer:

And what did he say.
He said yes.

Question: What did Mr. Kotter say about whether
or not the bank would accept late payments?
Answer: He did not say they would not accept
late payments.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Question: What deadline if any did he give you
to make those payments?
Answer:
He didn't give me any deadline.
[Tr 42-43]" (emphasis added)
Based upon this and other conversations in which the
Bank said the matter would have to be resolved by the end of
February, Maas assumed he had at least until February 28, 1975
to make the payments.

And the jury specifically found as a fac:

that the Bank waived payment until the end of the business day
of February 28, 1975.

[R.

320]

Of critical significance is the fact that the Bank hac
dealt with Maas for more than two years.

It knew he was making

payments on the 1972 Mack [Tr 87] and that Maas had the truck
(Id.)

It knew on February 25, 1975 that Allred had an agreement

with Maas to return the truck and where the truck was going to
be delivered [Tr 95].

Even more importantly, the Bank had

habitually accepted late payments from Maas.

All twenty-six of

the payments were past due when received, but the Bank accepted
each one of them.

[Tr 92]

The following testimony by Kotter clearly establishes
a pattern of dealings which had been well established by Februar

1975:
"Question: You knew that the Bank had habituali:
accepted late payments from Mr. Maas didn't you and
never repossessed before?
Answer:

Yes.
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1

Question:
of payments?
Answer:

You knew that Maas had made a number
Yes.

Question: You knew the account was paid down
from about $2,300.00 (sic) to $4,350.00 since the date
of the lease transaction.
Answer:

Yes.

Question: And yet you never made a specific
demand on Mr. Maas for payment by a specific deadline
date?
Answer:

No.

[Tr 97-98]" (emphasis added)

From the testimony of Mr. Kotter it also appears that
when the Bank learned that Kenneth Allred was bringing.the truck
to F-B Truck Lines, Mr. Kotter had a conversation with Mr.
Atwood,_ the Bank's executive vice-president.

[Tr 103]

In this

conversation it was determined that the Bank would repossess the
1972 Mack when Kenneth Allred drove it into the F-B yard.

Although Allred was informed of the conversation with Mr. Atwood
and the change in the Bank's position by deciding to repossess,
Maas was not.

[Tr 104]

This lengthy fact recitation has been included to show
that the appellant Bank led Mr. Maas to reasonably believe he
had until the end of the business day, February 28, 1975, to
make the payments.

On February 28, 1975, Maas, by Mr. Kotter's

own admission, appeared at the Bank and offered to make the past
due payments.

[Tr 98]

Mr. Kotter had previously agreed to hold
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the truck until the payments were made.

(Id.)

Yet when Maas

came in to make the payments, Mr. Kotter refused to accept them
since the Bank had, without notice to Maas, accepted the pay-off

j

I

from Arvel Allred.

I

Numerous decisions of this Court emphasize that where

I

I

one party establishes a course of dealings with a payor wherein
strict compliance is not followed, if thereafter the party
wishes to insist upon rigid compliance, he must reasonably
inform the payor and give him time to comply.

In Williamson

v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976), this Court held in an
installment note case that where the defendant payors were give:.
insufficient notice that plaintiffs would insist on strict
performance, a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would be
reversed.

In that case, it was noted that the plaintiffs had

accepted late payments in the past.
In the course of the opinion the Court wrote:
The clause which allows for acceleration in case
of default, if strictly enforced, is a severe
covenant, the invocation of which has similarity
to other forfeitures. The imposition of such
severe conditions is not favored in the law;
and one who seeks to impose them must not, either
by acts or omission permit another to assume that
the covenant will not be strictly enforced, th~
"crack down" on the obligor by rigidly ins is ti~
on enforcement, without giving some reasonable
notice and opportunity to comply. This i~ a
doctrine of equity which is firmly establ1sh7d
in our law by numerous decisions. A foundational
case is Christy v. Guild to the effect that ~
one has accepted overdue payments so that t~-f
payor has reasonably relied on such course ~
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/

conduct and been led to believe that the payee
will tolerate a failure of strict performance,
the latter cannot abruptly change course and insist
upon strict adherence to the covenant imposed and
enforce a harsh forfeiture. Id. at 1147-1148.
(emphasis supplied}.
In the earlier decision of Calhoun v. Universal
Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 146 P.2d 284 (1944), plaintiff entered
into a contract with the defendant for the purchase of a car.
All of the installment payments were late in some degree.

Without giving plaintiff clear prior notice, the defendant
repossessed.
constituted

Plaintiff contended that conduct of the defendant
a waiver of strict performance.

This Court agreed,

noting and citing with approval other decisions:
' . . . Having given appellee an extension of
time for the payment of the amount due it
thereby waived all right to forfeit the contract until the time of the extension had
expired. It could not on the next day and
before the time had expired, assume an inconsistent position . . . ' [citing Commercial
Credit Co. v. Macht, 89 Ind. App. 49, 165
N.E. 766]
Thus until notice of intention to enforce the
forfeiture provisions of the contract was given,
and a reasonable time to comply with the demand
for payment allowed, an indefinite extension of
time would not expire, and defendants could not
repossess the automobile. Calhoun, supra at 174,
146 P.2d at 287.
See also Columbia Airways, Inc. v. Stevens, 80 Utah
215, 14 P.2d 984 (1932); Munson v. Apartment & Hotel Inv. Co.,
62 Utah 13, 218 P. 109 (Utah 1923).

And see Price v. Ford Motor

Credit Co., 530 s.W.2d 249 (Mo. App. 1975); Sales v. Liberty
~ual Fire Insurance Co.,

273 So. 96 (Fla. App. 1973).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

Of course there was no written contract betwGen Maas
and the Bank.

But, during their more than two-year dealings

with each other, a rather definite course of conduct had been
established.

The Bank had accepted late payments.

attempt to repossess.

It did not

Statements of its agents or employees

reasonably led Maas to assume he had until after February 25 tc
make the past due payments.

The conduct of the Bank and Maas

created an implied agreement between them.

Maas knew the Bank

looked to him for, and accepted payments on the vehicle.
Bank knew Maas was using the truck in his business.

The

Each was

aware of specific interests of the other and a standard of
business dealings was created and followed.

If the Bank intende:!

to disturb or alter that course, it was obligated to give plait:·
tiff notice and an opportunity to comply with the altered course
of business dealings.

It did neither.

And, even if there were no agreement or standard
created by past conduct, at a minimum, the Bank knew that Maas
had an interest in the 1972 Mack.

[Tr 87]

Maas discussed with

Bank personnel the fact that he was buying the truck from
Kenneth Allred.

[Tr 10]

All of these either demonstrated or

should have demonstrated to the Bank that Maas had legitimate,
viable interests in the 1972 Mack.

Normally, the term lease

. .
implies a term and a revision
to the lessor or 1 an dlord after

its termination.

rnrnis s ion,
Consolidated Uranium Mines v. Tax Co ~
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__.......i

4 Utah 2d 236, 291 P.2d 895, 897 (1955).

However, during the

term of the lease the lessee has a vested interest in, Harding
v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 724, 243 P.2d 199, 203

(1952), and exclusive possession of the leased property.

Lichty

v. Model Homes, 211 P.2d 958, 966 (Wyo. 1949).
Plaintiff does not admit he merely had a lease interest
in the 1972 Mack.

But, even if that were all he had, the normal

rights inherent in a lease arrangement coupled with the representations and course of conduct of the Bank required that the
Bank give some notice of its intention to take and opportunity
to pay the past due installments before it repossessed. - And,
the fact that the payments to the Bank were to be credited
against plaintiff's eventual purchase of the 1972 Mack from
Allred heightened the need for the Bank to consider Maas'
interests.
Respondent respectfully urges that the cited facts
show as a matter of law that the defendant Bank converted the
1972 Mack on February 25, 1975 and that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
B.

By Delivering The 1972 Mack To Kenneth Allred After

Accepting The Payoff From Arvel Allred, The Bank Converted The
Vehicle Afresh.
Although the trial jury found in Proposition No. 7
that the Bank had waived payment by Maas of the three past due
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payments until the end of the Bank's business hours on Februar
28, 1975, the jury also answered as "False" Proposition No. 9

which read:
"The defendant, Utah Bank and Trust Company,
wrongfully converted the 1972 Mack Tractor on
February 25, 1975."
(emphasis added)
Respondent urges the facts require a conclusion thai
the Bank did convert the vehicle on that date.

It is possible

the jury became confused about the term "wrongfully" and assUJ:::
that the word involved a violation of criminal law, (and, of
course, respondent concedes this is not a criminal case).

hold the truck until the past due payments (not the payoff) wer:
made.

[Tr. 98].

Maas thereafter agreed to come up with those

payments and actually tendered them to Kotter on the 28th. The
jury might have found either:

1) that Maas conditionally

acquiesced in the February 25 repossession provided the Bank
delivered the truck to him if he made the payments by the 28th,
or; 2) that the Bank agreed to give Maas until the 28th to make
the payments after repossession, but converted the vehicle by
delivering it to Kenneth Allred before the time expired for Maa:
to bring the account current.
That a special verdict should be reconciled if pos.

sible is so widely accepted as to need no extended citation
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of

authorities. C.f. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah, 141, 146, 247 P.2d
273, 275

(1952) where this Court wrote:
" . . . Wherever there is uncertainty or doubt
in connection with the correlation of interrogatories with each other and their answers,
they should be so interpreted as to harmonize
with the findings of the jury if that can
reasonably be done."
In this case the jury determined the fair market value

of the truck; it found that there had been waiver by the Bank
until after the close of the banking day of February 28, 1975.
If the jury felt there were no "wrongful" conversions on February

25, there still could have been a conversion after that date,
but before March 1.

Evidence introduced at trial could have

been found by the jury as facts of a past February 25 conversion
by the Bank.

The verdict is not inherently inconsistent and

should be upheld.

POINT II
II.

EVEN IF THE REPOSSESSION BY THE BANK OF THE 1972

MACK ON FEBRUARY 25 WAS NOT A WRONGFUL CONVERSION, IT NONETHELESS DISPOSED OF THE UNIT IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.

A.

The Acceptance Of The Payoff Sum From A

~ranger, Arvel Allred, Was Not A Commercially Reasonable Dispo~tion As Required By Section 70A-9-504 Of The Utah Code Annotated,
~ As Amended.
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Regardless of any possible inconsistency of the jury
interrogatories on the conversion issue, the unambiguous findir
in proposition No. 6 was that the Bank had disposed of the 19)1
Mack in a commercially unreasonable manner.

(R. 320)

i

From th; I

evidence it appeared that while Maas was attempting to obtain
the past due payments and in the absence of the Bank giving Ma:,]
I

a deadline in which to make the payments, the Bank accepted the
payoff sum from a single inquirer, who was a stranger to prior
transactions [Tr 99].

No private sale was held [Tr 100].

Md

Mr. Maas never received prior notice to bid in, be present at
object to the disposition of the 1972 Mack.

[Tr50] .

O!

He was noti

in default under the lease purchase agreement, as amended, but I
the Bank's disposition of the 1972 Mack deprived him of the
right to use that vehicle, of his equity in it, and of his right
to purchase it after all monthly payments had been made.

The

payoff acc.epted by the Bank was less than one-quarter of what
the jury determined the value of the 1972 Mack was.
Section 70A-9-504 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code
provides that after default a secured creditor may dispose of
the collateral, but requires that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
commercially reasonable."

70A-9-504(3) Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

In its recent decision, Chrysler Credit Corporation v.
Burns, 562 P.2d 223 (Utah 1977), this Court appears to have held
that a sale is commercially unreasonable if no notice of the
time, date, place and manner of sale is given to the debtor by
the secured party.

Burns,

~at

234.

Decisions in other jurisdictions have imposed rather
stringent requirements on a secured creditor holding a sale or
disposition.

The creditor must exercise due diligence in at-

tempting to get the best price obtainable for the collateral.
Luxurest Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Furniture Warehouse Sales,
Inc., 15 UCC Reporting Service 546 (Ga. 1974).

At least one

court has held that a sale of a car at wholesale for less than
50 percent of its wholesale bluebook value was commercially
unreasonable as a matter of law.
~.

Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v.

45 Cal. App. 2d 12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1975).

And a

minimally advertised sale of collateral at a low price to a
single bidder who had no knowledge of local market values has
also been held to be commercially unreasonable.

Mercantile

Finance Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (D.C. Pa. 1969).
B.

Respondent Was Not Given Notice Of The

Disposition In Time To Protect His Interests And Equity In
The 1972 Mack.
Section 70A-9-504(3) of the Utah Uniform commercial
Code provides as follows:
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Disposition of the collateral may be by public
or private proceedings and may be made by way
of one or more contracts.
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels at any
time and place and on any terms but every aspect
of the disposition including the method, manner
time, place and terms must be commercially rea-'
sonable.
Unless collateral is perishable or
threatens to decline speedily in value or is of
a type customarily sold on a recognized market,
reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition
is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor, and except in the case of consumer
goods to any other person who has a security
interest in the collateral and who has duly filed
a financing statement indexed in the name of the
debtor in this state or who is known by the secured
party to have a security interest in the collateral.
(emphasis added) .
Section 70A-9-105 (d) defines "debtor" rather broadly:
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or
other performance of the obligation secured,
whether or not he owns or has rights in the
collateral, and includes the seller of accounts,
contract rights or chattel paper. Where the
debtor and the owner of the collateral are not
the same person, the term "debtor" means the
owner of the collateral in any provision of
the chapter dealing with the collateral, the
obliger in any provision dealing with the
obligation, and may include both where the
contest so requires . . .
Decisions in other jurisdictions interpreting these
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code have included as "debto:
one other than a party signing the security agreement who is
entitled to notice of a disposition of secured property.
Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315,
Service 417

In

11 UCC Reporting

·
finance compar
(1972 ) it
appeare d that the plaintiff
~
~
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I

had had prior dealings with the defendant.

Defendant repre-

sented to plaintiff he was a silent partner in his son-in-law's
business, but defendant did not sign the security agreement.
The plaintiff did not rely on the defendant and made a secured
loan to the son-in-law.

When default occurred, the plaintiff

repossessed the security but did not give notice to the defendant.

Defendant successfully argued that the failure to give

him notice, even though he did not sign the contract, precluded
the plaintiff from obtaining a deficiency judgment against him.
See also Hepworth v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 18 UCC Reporting
Service 542 (Fla. App. 1975) (guarantors of a note held to be a
"debtor" entitled to notice under the Code).

In Franklin National

Bank v. Katzel, 4 UCC Reporting Service 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)
a lessee of an airplane who did not have an option to purchase
at the end of the lease was held not entitled to UCC protection.
However, the opinion strongly suggests that had the defendant
had an option to purchase, he might have been protected.

The

pertinent language is as follows:
The lease does not afford defendant an option to
acquire the plane at the expiration of the lease,
therefore, the provisions of the Uniform commercial Code respecting a buyer's rights upon a
retaking are not applicable.
(emphasis added).
It should be noted that a number of authorities have
indicated that where a lease of equipment with an option to
purchase is such that where the lessee's only sensible course is
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to exercise the option, the lease is in economic reality a
security agreement.

In re Washington Processin~ Co., Inc., 3

I

UCC Reporting Service 4 7 5 ( 19 6 6) one rented a piece of equipme: /
for 36 months for almost $14, 000. 00.

The lease gave him an

option to purchase the equipment at the end of the term for
than $1, 500. 00.

The court held that under the UCC where the

price of the option to purchase was only about 10 percent oft:.,
total rental and substantially less than the market value oft:.'
equipment, and debtor's only sensible course was to exercise tr.;
option, and the lease was in economic reality a conditional
sales contract.
i

The similarities of the case before this court and
Washington Process case are evident.

t~'i

Maas' only sensible course

had he been permitted to maintain the lease was to have exercis0
the option.

He had intended to do so.

He told the Bank he

eventually wanted title to the 1972 Mack.

For reasons set fort

earlier, plaintiff was either a "debtor" or a holder of a secur·
ity interest within the meaning of 9-504 ( 3) and 9-105 (d) and wa:
entitled to notice he never received.
For failing to conduct a commercially reasonable sale,
for failure to give notice and for failure to meet the good
faith obligation of section 70A-l-203 of the Code, the defendar.:
Bank is liable to plaintiff for the loss of his equity in t~
1972 Mack and for damages attendant thereto.

Section 70A- 9-so:

provides as follows:
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'

Secured party's liability for failure to comply
with this part.--(1) If it is established that
the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate
terms and conditions. If the disposition has
occurred the debtor or any person entitled to
notification or whose security interest has been
made known to the secured party prior to the
disposition has a right to recover from the
secured party any loss caused by a failure to
comply with the provisions of this part. If the
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a
right to recover in any event an amount not less
than the credit service charge plus ten percent
of the principal amount of the debt or the time
price differential plus ten percent of the cash
price.
(emphasis supplied).
In the decision of this court in Chrysler Credit
Corporation v. Burns, supra, it was held that the debtor was
entitled to damages against the secured party for a commercially
unreasonable sale pursuant to Section 70A-9-507 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Regardless of whether the actions of the Bank constituted
a "sale" in the narrow meaning of the word, its delivery of the
truck to Kenneth Allred after accepting the payoff from Arvel
was a "disposition" within the meaning of Section 70A-9-504 (3)
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

For its improper disposi-

tion of that vehicle, the Bank should be liable to Mr. Maas and
the jury findings and the lower court verdict can rest independently on that basis.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence is clear that the Bank repossessed the
1972 Mack, after it had habitually accepted late payments from:
Maas, and without telling him that the Bank in the future wM: I
I

require strict performance of the payment schedule.

Indeed the I

Bank's actions were contrary to its representations to Maas
he had until the end of February to make the payments.

The jur'

so determined when it answered the special verdict finding that
the Bank waived payment of the delinquency until the end of
business hours on February 28, 1975.

These facts create a

conversion of the 1972 Mack by the Bank as a matter of law.
Further, the Bank's action of disposing of the 1972
Mack to Arvel Allred for approximately one-quarter of its value
and without holding a public sale or giving Maas notice of a
private sale was a commercially unreasonable disposition under
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

Again the jury determined

this to be the case when, after instruction on the law, it
found that the disposition of the 1972 Mack Tractor on February
27 or 28 by the Bank was commercially unreasonable.
Under either or both of the above jury findings, the
Judgment awarding Maas his equity in the 1972 Mack should be
affirmed.
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j

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~day

of June, 1977.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Brief
of Respondent was served this

~day
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on said date a copy thereof by United States Mail, first class
postage prepaid addressed to Layne B. Forbes, Esq., Attorney ic:
Appellant, Post Office Box 331, Bountiful, Utah
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